



Cornell University
College of Veterinary Medicine
Animal Health Diagnostic Center

USAHA Committee on One Health
10/24/18

One Health benefits of using pathogen WGS as a tool for herd management

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Overview

- 1. Pathogen Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) strategies**
- 2. Source tracking**
- 3. Pathotyping**
- 4. Antimicrobial resistance**



1. How pathogens are sequenced

Clinical Goal: provide **rapid, low-cost, clinically actionable data in lay terms** for veterinarians & producers



Most common strategies for pathogen WGS

**Pure cultures
(shotgun)**

Amplicons


**Selective
extraction**




The Whole Genome Sequencing Process

The Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) Process

WGS is a laboratory procedure that determines the order of bases in the genome of an organism in one process. WGS provides a very precise DNA fingerprint that can help link cases to one another allowing an outbreak to be detected and solved sooner.





National pathogen WGS database: heavily human-focused



U.S. National Library of Medicine
National Center for Biotechnology Information

[Health](#) > Pathogen Detection

Pathogen Detection **BETA**



Organism	Total isolates (10/3/18)
<i>Salmonella</i>	153,255
<i>E. Coli</i>	54,679
<i>Listeria monocytogenes</i>	20,879
<i>Campylobacter jejuni</i>	21,838
<i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i>	7,774
<i>Staphylococcus pseudintermedius</i>	249

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pathogens/

Culture-independent detection methods

*Mostly for environmental testing
– some commercial clinical tests for humans*

- Targeted amplification (PCR of multiple genes)
- Targeted metagenomics (sequencing of many genes)
- Shotgun metagenomics (sequences “all” DNA)





News › World › Europe

DNA blunder creates phantom serial killer

Police admit they wasted 15 years hunting for the 'Woman Without a Face'

She was a mysterious serial killer known as the "The Woman Without a Face" and detectives across Europe spent more than 15 years doing their utmost to bring her to justice for at least six brutal murders and a string of break-ins. Yesterday, however, they were forced to admit that she probably didn't exist.

The only clues that "The Woman Without a Face" left behind at 40 different crime scenes were DNA traces. These were collected on cotton swabs, supplied to the police in a number of European countries. Now police investigators have established that in all probability the DNA had not been left by their quarry but by a woman working for the German medical company supplying the swabs, who had inadvertently contaminated them.


German police who had been leading the hunt said they had probably been involved in one of the longest and most perplexing wild goose chases in criminal history. "This is a very embarrassing story," admitted police spokesman Josef Schneider.



2. Source tracking

Clinical Goals: pin point specific common sources of outbreak strains, monitor efficacy of autogenous bacterins/vaccines


Linking animal and feed strains




Managing environmental *Salmonella* contamination on dairy farms



FDA Vet-LIRN *Salmonella* surveillance, 2017 SNP Distance to Human Isolate (n = 54)










Managing recurring *Klebsiella* mastitis

- Dairy herd of 940 COWS
- Bulk milk SCC = 293,000 / mL
- Compared clinical, fecal, and environmental isolates to assess shedding potential

Fecal shedding



Monitoring new introductions of canine influenza to the USA







3. Pathotyping and species ID

Clinical Goal: differentiate normal host bacteria from those of clinical significance

Serotype prediction in bacteria and viruses



Nmhealth.org



Nature Reviews Microbiology




More precise speciation

- Many bacteria are not well identified by 16S alone (or by phenotypic characteristics of conventional microbiology)
 - Define/predict which biochemical tests are appropriate
- Many viral isolates go unspciated due to lack of specific tests
 - Complement other tests such as EM, IFA, PCR, cytotoxicity, chloroform resistance




Bacterial toxin gene detection





Informed wildlife management

- Food production
- Water resources






4. Antimicrobial resistance


Clinical Goals: detect markers that are not covered by species-specific AST panels, make antibiograms to support judicious use initiatives

WGS AMR predictions by gene have good correlation with sensitivity results

Bacterium	Gen/Phe correlation	Reference
<i>Salmonella enterica</i>	99.7%	Zankari et al. 2013, J Antimicrob Chemother
	99.00%	McDermott et al. 2016, Antim Agents Chemother
<i>Escherichia coli</i>	97.1%	Stoesser et al. 2013, J Antimicrob Chemother
	98.5%	Tyson et al. 2015, J Antimicrob Chemother
<i>Campylobacter</i> spp.	99.2%	Zhao et al. 2015, J Antimicrob Chemother
<i>Staph. aureus</i>	98.8%	Gordon et al. 2014, J Antimicrob Chemother
<i>Pneumococcus</i>	98%	Metcalf et al. 2016, Clin Microbiol Infect
<i>Enterobacteriaceae (B-lacs)</i>	100%	Shelburne et al. 2017, Clin Infect Dis
<i>Mycobacterium</i>	95.3%	Phelan et al. 2016, Genome Med
	92.3%	Walker et al. 2015, Lancet Infect Dis

MICs can now be predicted for some bacteria





**GOAL 2: Strengthen
National One-Health
Surveillance Efforts
to Combat Resistance**




**NATIONAL ACTION
PLAN FOR COMBATING
ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT
BACTERIA**


MARCH 2015



Distribution of Antibiotic Resistance Genes (ARGs) in *Salmonella* by Human Distance



Distribution of *Salmonella* ARGs by Host Type




Most extreme case – from 2017



Nearly pan-resistant *E. Coli* from canine fecal sample

**ECOL-17-VL-NY-
FL-0002**


aac(3)-Iid (gentamicin)
aadA1 (streptomycin)
aph(3'')-Ib (streptomycin)
aph(3')-Ia (kanamycin)
aph(6)-Id (streptomycin)
blaCMY-2 (penicillins, amoxi-clav, cephalosporins)
blaTEM-1 (penicillins)
catA1 (phenicols)
dfrA14 (trimethoprim)
mph(A) (macrolides)
qacL (disinfectants)
sul2, sul 3 (sulfonamides)
tet(B) (tetracycline)
gyrA mutations (fluoroquinolones)



One Health AMR Data Sharing

- Meeting sponsored by NY Integrated Food Safety Center of Excellence held May 2018 with stakeholders from different sectors
- Surveillance from WGS AMR data is more rapidly available than traditional methods
 - NARMS monitors NCBI for emerging resistance threats
 - Also publically accessible to researchers and other agencies
- Importance of data integrity, security, and confidentiality
 - NAHLN study emphasizing secure messaging
- A tiered system with a 3rd party protector of identifiable information proposed as safeguard for confidentiality





Take-home points

1. WGS supports preventative controls in herd management
2. Open data is critical for disease surveillance

Acknowledgments

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